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Abstract—Bluetooth has found widespread adoption in
phones, wireless headsets, stethoscopes, glucose monitors, and
oximeters for communication of, at times, very critical informa-
tion. However, the link keys and encryption keys in Bluetooth
are ultimately generated from a short 4 digit PIN, which
can be cracked off-line. We develop an alternative for secure
communication between Bluetooth devices using the symmetric
wireless channel characteristics. Existing approaches to secret
key extraction primarily use measurements from a fixed, single
channel (e.g., a 20 MHz WiFi channel); however in the presence of
heavy WiFi traffic, the packet exchange rate in such approaches
can reduce as much as 200×. We build and evaluate a new
method, which is robust to heavy WiFi traffic, using a very wide
bandwidth (B  20 MHz) in conjunction with random frequency
hopping. We implement our secret key extraction on two Google
Nexus One smartphones and conduct numerous experiments in
indoor-hallway and outdoor settings. Using extensive real-world
measurements, we show that outdoor settings are best suited for
secret key extraction using Bluetooth. We also show that even in
the absence of heavy WiFi traffic, the performance of secret key
generation using Bluetooth is comparable to that of WiFi while
using much lower transmit power.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a tremendous growth in the proliferation
of pervasive computing devices such as smartphones, tablets,
and medical devices. In general, these devices are bundled
with an array of wireless technologies, mainly, cellular, WiFi,
and Bluetooth. Bluetooth, in particular, has found widespread
adoption in phones, wireless headsets, stethoscopes, glucose
monitors, and oximeters for communication of, at times, very
critical information [1]. However, serious security vulnerabil-
ities have been discovered for Bluetooth [2]. For instance,
the link keys and encryption keys in Bluetooth are ultimately
generated from a short 4 digit PIN, which can be cracked off-
line [2], [3], [4]. In this paper, we develop an alternative secure
communication method for Bluetooth devices that is capable
of producing arbitrarily long secret keys, which when used
as one-time pad, can provide security against adversaries with
unlimited computational power.
We propose to exploit the characteristics of the wire-
less channel between two Bluetooth nodes, Alice and Bob,




Alice–Eve ≠ Alice–Bob ≠ Bob–Eve
Fig. 1. Symmetric wireless channel between Bluetooth devices Alice and
Bob.
The wireless channel between any two nodes is symmet-
ric/reciprocal since the multi-path properties of the channel
which include gains, phase shifts and delays are identical on
both directions of the link. These wireless channel character-
istics vary with time due to changes in the environment such
as the movement of objects or people. Moreover, the multi-
path characteristics are location-specific – an eavesdropper,
Eve, who is separated by a few wavelengths from Alice and
Bob, cannot measure the same multi-path characteristics [5],
[6] (Figure 1). Thus, there is an inherent secret shared between
any two wireless nodes that can communicate with each other
directly, and we take advantage of this fact to establish a
secret key between them. Secret key extraction from time
and space varying wireless channels is not new. There exists
a vast amount of work on this topic; however, there is no
existing work on secret key extraction using Bluetooth. The
wide-spread use of Bluetooth and its unique strengths and
limitations (described later in this paper) make it an interesting
target for exploration for secret key extraction. This exploration
is the focus of our paper.
Existing approaches (e.g., [6]) to secret key extraction
primarily use measurements from a fixed, single channel (e.g.,
a 20 MHz WiFi channel as in [6]) for secret key establish-
ment. Measuring the channel involves the exchange of packets
between Alice and Bob. However, as we demonstrate later
in this paper, in the case of WiFi, the packet exchange rate978-1-4799-4657-0/14/$31.00 c© 2014 IEEE
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can reduce by as much as 200× in the presence of heavy
traffic. Motivated by this observation, we build and evaluate a
new method that we call robust secret key extraction (RSKE)
using Bluetooth that uses a very wide bandwidth (B  20
MHz) in conjunction with random frequency hopping over a
set of narrow channels within B to avoid those frequencies
that are heavily used. We experimentally show that with our
approach using Bluetooth, we can exchange packets and collect
measurements for secret key extraction even under heavy WiFi
traffic, an order of magnitude faster in comparison to using
WiFi.
Our RSKE system comprises of different stages including
the more traditional sampling, quantization [6], information
reconciliation [7], and privacy amplification [8], and a more
recently proposed interpolation [9] stage. In the sampling
stage, Alice and Bob exchange a series of packets to collect
the received signal strength (RSS) measurements. Then, Alice
and Bob individually estimate their half-duplex measurements
at common time instants using the interpolation stage to reduce
asymmetry in their measurements. Next, they quantize their
measurements to obtain an initial bit sequence [6]. Then, they
reconcile potential mismatches in their initial bit sequence
using the information reconciliation stage [7] and finally, they
use the privacy amplification [8] stage to obtain a high entropy
secret bit sequence.
We implement our secret key extraction on two Google
Nexus One smartphones and using extensive real-world mea-
surements from these phones, we show that (i) inclusion of
an interpolation stage in secret key extraction, significantly
reduces the mismatch in the quantized bits of Alice and Bob,
(ii) outdoor settings achieve significantly higher secret key
generation rate in comparison to indoor-hallway settings, (iii)
secret bit sequences that we obtain using Bluetooth RSS values
pass eight different randomness tests of the NIST test suite that
we conduct, (iv) even in the absence of heavy WiFi traffic,
RSKE using Bluetooth can achieve secret key generation
performance that is comparable to using WiFi even with the
use of much lower transmit power.
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION METHODOLOGY
In the first step of the secret key generation process,
namely, sampling, Alice and Bob collect a time series of RSS
measurements by exchanging packets. In an earlier work [6],
Premnath et al. have used a three stage process to convert a
set of RSS measurements into a secret bit sequence. These
three stages are quantization, information reconciliation and
privacy amplification. For secret key extraction using Bluetooth
RSS measurements, we also consider an additional stage called
interpolation from Patwari et al.’s work [9]. Figure 2 shows the
various stages in the secret key extraction process. We discuss
each of these steps in detail as follows.
A. Quantization of RSS samples
Quantization is the process of converting a sequence of
RSS measurements into a sequence of bits. Alice and Bob per-
form the following steps in generating an initial bit sequence:
(i) define an upper threshold q+ and a lower threshold q−,
where q+ = µ + α × σ and q− = µ − α × σ; here µ and
σ represent the mean and standard deviation over a window
of RSS measurements, with α ≥ 0. (ii) RSS values less than
the lower threshold are encoded as zero; RSS values greater
than the upper threshold are encoded as bit one and all RSS
values that lie between the upper and the lower threshold are
discarded. (iii) maintain a list of indices of discarded RSS
values and exchange it with each other so that they exclude
all such indices from further consideration for secret key
extraction.
In the quantization of Bluetooth RSS values, we reduce the
effects of shadow fading, which are caused due to obstructions
from large objects in the environment. This ensures that the bit
sequence obtained after quantization is mostly from the hard-
to-predict effects of small scale fading. Note that small scale
fading is caused because of relative motion between the radios
and different objects in the environment. Premnath et al. [10]
have shown that effects of shadow fading can be effectively
filtered out if the window size, over which the quantization
thresholds are computed, is chosen according to the sampling
rate and the speed of nodes. We incorporate this technique
to calculate the right window size for the quantization of
Bluetooth RSS values.
B. Information reconciliation of quantized bits
The quantized bits sequences of Alice and Bob may have
minor differences due to noise, interference, hardware manu-
facturing variations, half-duplex nature of communication, etc.
To reconcile any differences in the bit sequences, we use the
Cascade protocol [7]. In Cascade, Alice and Bob exchange
parity information to locate and correct any bit mismatches
iteratively until there is a high probability of success.
C. Privacy amplification of reconciled bit stream
When the channel is sampled faster than the rate at which it
changes, there may be short term correlation in the subsequent
bits of Alice and Bob. Moreover, a fraction of information, in
the form of parity bits, is leaked into the insecure public chan-
nel during information reconciliation. Privacy amplification
[8] addresses both these problems by applying universal hash
function to generate shorter bit sequence with high entropy,
where the output length of the hash function is chosen based
on the entropy of the bit stream and also on the amount of
information leaked during information reconciliation.
D. Interpolation of RSS samples
In order to deal with the asymmetry in RSS values at Alice
and Bob that is caused due to the half-duplex nature of the
transceivers, Patwari et al. [9] have used a pre-quantization
interpolation step. Interpolation addresses the asymmetry by
estimating the measurements of Alice and Bob at common
time instants. We use the interpolation stage, in addition to the
information reconciliation stage, to minimize the bit mismatch
probability. We show in Section VII that interpolation is
essential for secret key extraction using Bluetooth since it
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Fig. 2. RSS-based secret key extraction process
can be drastically reduce the percentage of mismatch in the
quantized bits of Alice and Bob.
Let TR denote the time delay between two subsequent
measurements of Alice or Bob, and τa(i) and τb(i) denote
the time instants at which Alice and Bob record their ith









;where τa(i) < τb(i)
If Alice and Bob estimate their measurements at a delay
of (1+µ)TR and (1−µ)TR respectively, then we would have
simultaneous estimates for their measurements. In our work,
we use this interpolation technique as a pre-quantization stage
to reduce the probability of bit mismatches. The complete
process of Bluetooth RSS-based secret key extraction that we
use in this work is shown in Figure 2.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that the adversary, Eve, can listen to all
conversations between the genuine parties, Alice and Bob. The
adversary can also measure the channel between herself and
Alice and Bob at the same time as them. However, Eve cannot
be positioned very close to either Alice or Bob. Specifically,
Eve should be several wavelengths away from both of them
so that she measures an uncorrelated channel [5], [6]. The
algorithms for key extraction along with the parameters used
are public. We assume that the data integrity is protected, i.e.,
Eve is not interested in manipulating the messages between
Alice and Bob. Eve is capable of affecting the wireless channel
between Alice and Bob by moving objects randomly in the
environment. However, she cannot control the movements to
an extent as to significantly increase the coherence time of
the channel. Bluetooth uses a standardized algorithm [11] to
hop between different channels in the 2.4 GHz band, where
the hopping sequence is common to all nodes in the Bluetooth
piconet. We assume that Eve does not belong to the piconet and
hence does not know the hopping sequence. However, she can
jam the WiFi channels in the same 2.4 GHz band. Our scheme
does not authenticate Alice or Bob, and is not immune to active
person-in-the-middle attacks. The well-known Diffie-Hellman
secret key establishment scheme has found wide-spread use
in network security protocols and standards even without an
authentication mechanism. We believe that our scheme will
provide a strong alternative to the Diffie-Hellman scheme for
establishing session keys in wireless networks.
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF BLUETOOTH TO HEAVY TRAFFIC
Sampling, the first step in the secret key extraction process,
involves the exchange of probe packets between Alice and Bob
to collect the RSS values. In this section, we experimentally
demonstrate that in the presence of heavy traffic, the sampling
period could become excessively large for WiFi, while Blue-
tooth is robust to heavy traffic.
Consider a network with three nodes, A, B and C. Assume
that nodes A and B are exchanging a high rate of data,
for instance, streaming videos or exchanging large data files
between them. Now, node C wants to establish a secret key
with one of these nodes, say node A, using the characteristics
of the wireless channel between itself and node A. If nodes A
and C choose to use the existing WiFi channel, (i) nodes A and
C will be able to sample the channel only at a very low rate
for collecting RSS measurements, and (ii) it will slow-down
the existing data transfer that is taking place between nodes
A and B due to the new exchange of probe packets between
nodes A and C for collecting RSS measurements.

















wifi heavy bluetooth heavy bluetooth light wifi light
Fig. 3. Sampling period for WiFi and Bluetooth under heavy and light WiFi
traffic.
We create an 802.11 ad hoc network with 3 nodes A, B
and C for our simple experiment. Nodes A and B, which
are about 4 ft to 7 ft from node C in an indoor setting,
continuously exchange large UDP packets as fast as they can.
In our experiment, nodes A and B were able to exchange about
9.5 Mbps of application layer data in each direction. Figure 3
shows the achievable sampling period over 50 consecutive
successful packet exchanges.
Observation 1: While the WiFi sampling period is a mere
1.5 ms on average in the absence of UDP traffic, it increases
more than 200× to about 314 ms on average when there is
heavy UDP traffic! Note that this sampling period far exceeds
the coherence time interval of indoor environments with typical
mobility. As a result, there will be a great degree of asymmetry
in the measurements (and consequently the quantized bits) of
nodes A and C.
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Observation 2: If nodes A and C exchange probe packets
over the Bluetooth interface, on the other hand, the sampling
period is about 18 ms, on average, with (or without) the
exchange of WiFi UDP traffic between nodes A and B. Thus,
in the presence of heavy WiFi traffic, if we choose to use
Bluetooth, we can collect a given number of RSS measure-
ments at least an order of magnitude faster in comparison
to WiFi there by significantly speeding up the secret key
extraction process. Bluetooth achieves lower sampling period
and remains robust to heavy WiFi traffic since it uses a very
wide bandwidth (B  20 MHz) in conjunction with random
frequency hopping over a set of narrow channels within B to
avoid those frequencies that are heavily used.
To summarize, Bluetooth is robust to heavy traffic; it is
capable of achieving desirably low sampling period; and hence
it is very promising for secret key extraction. Motivated by
these results, we describe our robust secret key extraction
approach in the next section.
V. ROBUST SECRET KEY EXTRACTION METHOD
Existing approaches (e.g., [6]) primarily use measurements
from a fixed, single channel (e.g., a 20 MHz WiFi channel as
in [6]) for secret key extraction. However, these existing ap-
proaches perform poorly in the presence of heavy WiFi traffic
– in fact, as we experimentally demonstrate in Section IV, the
WiFi channel sampling rate can reduce by as much as two
orders of magnitude. To address this problem, we develop a
new mechanism, Robust Secret Key Extraction (RSKE), that
uses a wider bandwidth B (with B  20 MHz) and randomly
hops over a set of narrow channels within B that specifically












Fig. 4. Adaptive frequency hopping excludes frequencies that are heavily
used.
We elucidate our RSKE approach using the frequency
hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) mechanism of Bluetooth,
in which the signals at the physical layer are transmitted by
rapidly switching or hopping frequencies over a very wide
bandwidth [12]. Bluetooth divides the 2.4 GHz band into
79 channels and hops at the rate of 800 times per second
in a pseudo-random fashion. When some arbitrary wireless
device in the vicinity operates in the 2.4 GHz frequency
band, Bluetooth devices identify the channels used by the
interfering device and remap the hopping sequence to exclude
them. To achieve this exclusion of channels with interference,
Bluetooth devices periodically estimate the channel usage
and accordingly adapt their frequency hopping pattern. This
technique is referred to as Adaptive Frequency Hopping (AFH)
[13]. Figure 4 illustrates the operation of AFH mechanism in
the presence of WiFi traffic on two different channels A and
B. Note here that AFH specifically avoids the interfering WiFi
channels.
Each Bluetooth device maintains an AFH channel map,
which indicates the channels that are occupied by other in-
terfering devices. The AFH channel map contains 79 one-bit
fields, where each bit indicates the status of the corresponding
channel. A bit 1 in the nth position indicates that the nth
channel is used and similarly, bit 0 indicates a channel that
is not used by other devices. Bluetooth can operate success-
fully when the hopping sequence includes a minimum of 20
channels out of a total of 79 available channels [11].
Bluetooth uses a hop sequence generator that takes in input
parameters including AFH channel map, Bluetooth device
address and clock of the master, etc., performs operations such
as addition, XOR, permutation, etc. on these input parameters
to output a pseudo-random sequence of channel indices [12],
[11]. This sequence of indices is then mapped into actual
frequencies in the 2.4 GHz band using the following relation:
f = 2402+k MHz, k = 0, ..., 78, where k denotes the channel
index. Note that the channels are spaced 1 MHz apart.
Obtaining symmetric RSS measurements: When a pair
of Master and Slave Bluetooth devices, i.e., Alice and Bob,
exchange a sequence of packets, each pair in this sequence
– which includes a packet transmission from Alice to Bob
and the corresponding response packet transmission from
Bob to Alice – uses the same frequency. This ensures the
reciprocity/symmetry of the measurements of Alice and Bob
in a frequency selective fading channel.
We summarize the steps involved in the RSKE approach
as follows.
1) Estimate channel usage over the frequencies in the
interval [F, (F + (N − 1) × 106)] and obtain the
channel map; here F is the smallest carrier fre-
quency, N is the number of channels and for Blue-
tooth, F = 2402 MHz and N = 79 channels.
2) Generate random hopping sequence S based on
channel map; an arbitrary element in the sequence
S at index i, S(i) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , (N − 1)} and
channel map(S(i)) = 0.
3) Choose fi = F + S(i),∀S(i) ∈ S, where i is the
packet sequence number.
4) Exchange packet pair (request from Alice and corre-
sponding response from Bob) with sequence number
i using frequency fi.
5) Record RSS measurement (at both Alice and Bob)
corresponding to sequence number i.
6) Jump to Step 1 periodically to assess whether a new
hopping sequence has to be generated.
7) Once Alice and Bob collect the RSS measurements,
they perform interpolation [9] and quantization [6].
Then, they reconcile potential mismatches in their
initial bit sequence using information reconciliation
[7] and finally they use privacy amplification [8] to
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obtain output secret bit sequence with high entropy.
While we have described the operation of RSKE in the
context of Bluetooth, this approach is also applicable to other
wireless technologies that use FHSS at the physical layer.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We use two Google Nexus One smartphones in our imple-
mentation which are equipped with BCM4329EKUBG Broad-
com chips [14]. These support a Bluetooth Core Specification
Version 2.1 with enhanced data rate technology. Both the
phones run the Android 2.1 operating system.
In our implementation, we use the Bluetooth BlueZ proto-
col stack [15] for Android. Programming the BlueZ protocol
stack is significantly simpler than using two other possible
options – Android Native Development toolkit (NDK) and
Android Software Development toolkit (SDK).
A. Methods for Sampling the Bluetooth Channel
1) Inquiry based RSS Method: The inquiry1 mode with RSS
is the only method to obtain actual raw RSS values. The Host
controller Interface (HCI) of the BlueZ protocol stack [15]
provides functions to configure a device in the inquiry mode
with RSS, which allows one to obtain the RSS value for any
inquiry response message received from other devices. While
the inquiry based RSS method allows one to obtain raw RSS
values, the following issues associated with this method make
it unsuitable for secret key extraction.
First, due to the random back-off algorithm in the inquiry
response state and due to the large time delays involved in the
inquiry process, we can collect the RSS values only at a very
low rate. For instance, in order to collect adequate response
packets, an inquiry sub-state lasts for a duration of at least
10.4 seconds [11]. More importantly, the user cannot adjust
the inquiry intervals to increase the sampling rate. Second, the
inquiry message is a broadcast message and any device in the
proximity can respond to this message. There is no way for
the inquiring device to select one specific device that it needs
response from with which it wants to establish the secret key.
Last, the devices must be in the discoverable mode in order
to respond to an inquiry message. However, due to security
concerns, current Bluetooth configuration for smartphones
allows a device to be in discoverable mode for a maximum
of 180 seconds only. A period of 180 seconds is too small
to collect enough RSS measurements and extract keys of any
reasonable size.
2) Connection based RSS Method: Using the alternative
connection based RSS method, we can obtain an RSS mea-
surement for every data packet received over a connection
established between two Bluetooth devices at very high rate
between 18 Hz to 24 Hz. However, this method does not return
the raw RSS values. Instead, the returned RSS value indicates
1A Bluetooth device uses inquiry mode to discover other devices in
proximity.
whether the actual measurement is above, below, or within the
Golden Receive Power Range (GRPR) [12].
The GRPR, which is considered as the ideal received power
range, is defined using a lower and an upper threshold. The
lower threshold corresponds to a received power between -56
dBm and 6 dB above the actual sensitivity of the receiver.
The upper threshold is 20 dB above the lower threshold level
with an accuracy of ±6 dB [11]. A positive or negative RSS
(in dB) indicates a received power level above or below the
GRPR respectively, while a zero implies that it is ideal (i.e.,
within GRPR).
Importantly, note that this method of collecting RSS values
results in a loss of many useful measurements. This is because,
unless the RSS values lie outside the ideal range, these cannot
be measured and will appear as a zero. We observe from our
experiments that, for small distances such as 2 feet in a indoor
hallway setting, the number of zeroes could be as high as 90%
of the total number of samples. Even in the presence of large
number of zeros in certain settings, the sampling rate is higher
using the connection-based RSS method. Thus, we use this
method in our work.
B. L2CAP packet exchange protocol
We develop a simple protocol using L2CAP sockets for
collecting the RSS values. In this protocol, Alice sends a
request L2CAP packet to Bob, who measures the RSS value for
the received packet and sends back a reply L2CAP packet for
which Alice measures the RSS value. We use the hci read rssi
function to read the RSS value for each received packet. Alice
and Bob continue to exchange these L2CAP request/reply
packets to obtain a time series of RSS values.
We choose to use L2CAP for packet exchange since it
provides a reliable connection oriented link that handles packet
losses through retransmission. Information frames (I-frame)
are used to carry information payload and supervisory frames
(S-frame) are used to acknowledge information frames and
request retransmissions, if necessary [12].
We implement the interpolation and quantization of RSS
values as in [6]. For information reconciliation and privacy
amplification, we implement the Cascade protocol [7] and
universal hash functions respectively as in [6].
VII. EXPERIMENTATION
We first describe our experimental setup in Section VII-A,
and then present our results in Section VII-B.
A. Experimental Setup
We conduct several experiments under two different mobile
environments2 (indoor-hallways and outdoors) with varying
distances between Alice and Bob. In each environment, we
perform five walk-experiments, where the phones are carried
2Using real world measurements of WiFi channel, Jana et al. [5], have
established that mobile settings are best suited for secret key extraction.
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at normal walking speed and are separated by an average
distance of x feet, where x ∈ {2, 5, 10, 20, 30}. In all of our
experiments, Alice and Bob use a maximum transmit power
of 3dBm3.
Our indoor environment is a hallway on the third floor of
our Engineering Building in our university campus. Figure 5
shows our experimental setup for the hallway environment and
the path taken by Alice and Bob during these experiments.
We conduct a second set of experiments in an outdoor
environment across varying terrain, with many trees, strolling
people, pets and skate boarders. Alice and Bob are carried at
normal walking speed from our Engineering Building to the
Library in our university campus. Figure 6 shows the trajectory
of Alice and Bob in the outdoor environment.
We collect 30000 RSS samples in each experiment. We
find that the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) is higher in hallways
in comparison to outdoor settings. While the sampling rate
for hallways is around 24 Hz, variable packet loss rate under
outdoors causes the sampling rate to change from 18 Hz to 24
Hz depending on the distance between Alice and Bob.
B. Results
We evaluate the performance of Bluetooth for secret key
extraction using three metrics - (i) entropy, which captures
the degree of randomness associated with each secret bit; (ii)
bit mismatch rate, which is defined as the ratio of number of
bits that do not match between Alice and Bob to the total
number of bits extracted after the quantization step; and (iii)
secret bit rate, which is defined as the average number of
secret bits extracted per measurement; the secret bit rate is
calculated in terms of the final output bits after accounting
for bit losses during information reconciliation and privacy
amplification stages.



















Fig. 7. Bit mismatch rate as a function of quantization parameter α for
varying distances under hallway settings (without interpolation).
1) Bit mismatch rate under hallway settings: Figure 7
shows the bit mismatch rate as a function of the quantization
parameter, α for different distances under hallway settings;
recall that α parameterizes the quantization thresholds q = µ±
α×σ; essentially, α controls the width of the censored region
(i.e., the region between the upper and lower thresholds). When
3We experimentally find that beyond reasonably small distances (≤ 2.75
ft), in our Google phones, Bluetooth switches to maximum transmit power.
we consider the support of two correlated random variables,
each representing a measurement from Alice and Bob, the
area where these random variables (when quantized) disagree,
becomes large as the area corresponding to the censored region
is reduced. Thus the bit mismatch rate decreases with increase
in the value of α.
We find that there is no clear relation between bit mismatch
rates and distance under hallway settings because the SNR is
high for all distances and the sampling rate does not change
with distance, which is around 24 Hz for all distances. This
is possibly because the hallway setting behaves like a wave
guide, where the signal propagation is mostly confined within
the hallway due to multiple reflections from the walls, ceiling
and the floor [16]. As a result, there is minimal propagation
loss with considerable variation in distance and consequently
there is little difference in performance due to variation in
distance under hallway settings.


















Fig. 8. Bit mismatch rate as a function of quantization parameter α for
varying distances under hallway settings with the use of interpolation.
Effect of interpolation: As we have discussed in Sec-
tion II-D, the interpolation stage estimates the measurements
of Alice and Bob from a half-duplex channel at common time
instants. We find that interpolation reduces the bit mismatch
rate considerably as we have shown in Figure 8 (compare
with Figure 7). However, the bit mismatch rate is still high
enough under hallway settings to leak out a large fraction of
information in the information reconciliation stage.




















Fig. 9. Secret bit rate as a function of quantization parameter α for various
distances under hallway settings with the use of interpolation.
2) Secret bit rate under hallway settings: Figure 9 shows
the secret bit rate as a function of the quantization parameter,
α for different distances under hallway settings, when interpo-
lation is applied to the measurements of Alice and Bob. For
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Fig. 5. Hallway experimental setup
Fig. 6. Outdoor experimental setup (From Google Earth)
each distance, note that above a particular α value, the secret
bit rate decreases as a greater fraction of measurements is
censored. However, the secret bit rate also decreases below that
particular α value due to higher bit mismatch rate (with low
α values) and the consequent increase in information leakage
in the information reconciliation stage.
We show the secret bit rate results with the use of interpola-
tion only since it increases the peak secret bit rate for hallway
settings by up to 53.8%. Again there is no clear relationship
between secret bit rate and distance due to the same reasons
listed under Section VII-B1. However, in general, we observe
that the secret bit rate in the hallway settings is low due to
high bit mismatch rate.
3) Fraction of Zero-RSS values: We compare the fraction
of zero-RSS values for hallway and outdoor settings in Fig-
ure 10. We find that hallway experiments have considerably
large fraction of zero-RSS values in comparison to outdoor
settings for all distances. This occurs because in the hallway















Fig. 10. Fraction of zeroes versus distance
settings, the received power mostly lies within the GRPR.
A large number of zero-RSS values will lead to loss of
entropy, thus reducing the secret bit rate in hallway settings.
Importantly, Figure 10 also hints that we should observe higher
secret bit rate under outdoor settings as we shall see in the
following subsections.
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TABLE I. STANDARD DEVIATION (σ) OF RSS MEASUREMENTS
AVERAGED OVER ALL THE QUANTIZATION BLOCKS.



























Fig. 11. Bit mismatch rate as a function of quantization parameter α for
varying distances under outdoor settings (with interpolation).
4) Bit mismatch rate under outdoors with interpolation:
We notice that for outdoor settings, in general, the bit mismatch
rate increases with distance (Figure 11) due to the decrease in
SNR with distance. We observe that under outdoor settings,
the standard deviation of RSS measurements is considerably
higher than the hallway settings (Table I). When the RSS
variations have a small range (as in the hallways), even minor
differences in the measurements of Alice and Bob could result
in mismatches in their quantized bits. However, with a large
variation of RSS values, we achieve significantly lower bit
mismatch rates under outdoor settings as we have shown in
Figure 11 (compare with Figure 8).





















Fig. 12. Secret bit rate as a function of quantization parameter α for varying
distances under outdoor settings (with interpolation).
5) Secret bit rate under outdoors (with interpolation):
When we compare the secret bit rates in hallways (Figure 9)
with those under outdoor settings (Figure 12), we can ob-
serve that outdoor conditions are significantly better for key
extraction using Bluetooth. We can see from Figure 9 and
Figure 12 that the maximum secret bit rate is only around
0.20 under hallways, whereas the secret bit rate is around
0.36 for outdoors. Since the bit mismatch rate under outdoors
TABLE II. SECRET KEY EXTRACTION AT SMALL DISTANCES.
Metric Indoor Outdoor
Secret bit rate 0.0080 0.2406
Avg. no. of consecutive zero RSS values 37.6 5.91
Std. deviation of RSS values of each block 0.514 5.36
TABLE III. NIST APPROXIMATE ENTROPY TEST RESULTS





is lower in comparison to hallways as we have shown in
Section VII-B4, we observe lower information leakage in the
information reconciliation stage and consequently much higher
secret bit rates in outdoor settings.
6) Key extraction for small distances: We conduct experi-
ments maintaining a distance of 2ft between Alice and Bob. We
observe that under hallway settings the secret bit rate is very
close to zero, whereas under outdoor settings the secret bit rate
is around 0.24. Table II compares the results of hallway and
outdoor settings. The inferior performance in hallway settings
can be explained by high bit mismatch and due to very large
burst of consecutive zero RSS values.
7) Entropy of secret bits: We conduct numerous NIST
statistical tests to verify the randomness of the output secret
bit streams generated using Bluetooth. Table III shows the per-
bit entropy values for the output secret bit streams that we
have extracted in our experiments; notice that all the values
are almost close to one indicating that there is almost one bit
of uncertainty associated with each output bit. In Table IV
and Table V, we have shown the p-value for eight NIST tests,
TABLE IV. P-VALUES FROM NIST STATISTICAL TESTS FOR OUTDOOR
EXPERIMENTS.
Test 30 ft 20 ft 10 ft 5 ft
Frequency 0.86 0.08 0.51 0.87
Block Frequency 0.17 0.18 0.78 0.12
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.77 0.14 0.78 0.86
Cum. sums (rev) 0.60 0.08 0.63 0.71
Runs 0.80 0.57 0.73 0.30
Longest run of 1 0.69 0.42 0.25 0.48
FFT 1.00 0.14 0.55 0.16
Approx. Entropy 0.17 0.06 0.46 0.22
Serial 0.68, 0.64 0.54, 0.60 0.50, 0.14 0.55, 0.40
TABLE V. P-VALUES FROM NIST STATISTICAL TEST FOR HALLWAY
EXPERIMENTS.
Test 30 ft 20 ft 10 ft 5 ft
Frequency 0.28 0.55 0.60 0.79
Block Frequency 0.20 0.28 0.66 0.33
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.54 0.70 0.90 0.79
Cum. sums (rev) 0.39 0.29 0.61 0.55
Runs 0.23 0.40 0.55 0.97
Longest run of 1 0.48 0.21 0.92 0.89
FFT 0.96 0.86 0.73 0.97
Approx. Entropy 0.48 0.21 0.18 0.16
Serial 0.32, 0.29 0.28, 0.20 0.09, 0.01 0.76, 0.82
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TABLE VI. COMPARISON OF SECRET BIT RATES - BLUETOOTH VS
WIFI
Setting Secret bits per probe
WiFi 20 ft outdoor 0.2482
Bluetooth 20 ft outdoor 0.2761
Bluetooth 30 ft outdoor 0.2079
for different distances. A p-value greater than 0.01 indicates
that the input bit sequence is random with a confidence of
99%. Notice that all the p-values are greater than 0.01, which
verifies that all the secret bits streams are random with a very
high degree of confidence.
8) Comparison of WiFi and Bluetooth secret bit rates:
Premnath et al. [6] evaluated secret key extraction on Android
smartphones using WiFi. We observe that the secret bit rate
with WiFi under outdoor settings is comparable to the secret
bit rate that we achieve with Bluetooth under similar settings
(Table VI) even though Bluetooth uses lower transmit power.
In their outdoor experiments, Premnath et al. used a higher
transmit power of 8 dBm whereas we use a lower transmit
power of 3 dBm for Bluetooth. Therefore, Bluetooth enables
power-efficient secret key extraction.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There is a vast amount of literature on secret key extraction
from time and space varying wireless wireless channels. In
this section, we only cite the most relevant existing work
for brevity. Premnath et al. [6] have used Android smart
phones to extract secret keys from WiFi RSS measurements.
Earlier, Croft et al. demonstrated their adaptive ranking-based
uncorrelated bit extraction (ARUBE [17]) method using WiFi
RSS measurements from Android smart phones. However, as
we have demonstrated in our work, when there is heavy traffic,
the WiFi sampling period could be excessively large, adversely
affecting the secret key extraction performance in comparison
to using Bluetooth.
Other existing works [10], [9] use low power devices like
TelosB nodes for RSSI-based secret key extraction. Premnath
et al. [10] have explored the use of multiple frequencies
for efficient, high rate secret key extraction. Their results
show that the use of multiple frequencies enables extraction
of stronger secret keys. While their method uses multiple
frequencies for concurrent transmissions acros multiple telosB
nodes, Bluetooth devices that we use in our research use
multiple frequencies for frequency hopping.
Recently, Mathur et al. [18] have designed a scheme to
extract secret keys by observing signals from public sources
such as radio or television, which does not require Alice and
Bob to exchange packets during the sampling stage. However,
to record symmetric measurements, in their scheme the two
nodes must be less than half the wave length away, which is
6.25 cm for the 2.4 GHz range. In contrast, we evaluate our
RSKE approach using Bluetooth for larger distances, up to 30
ft.
IX. CONCLUSION
We explored the use of wireless channel characteristics
for establishing strong secret keys of arbitrary length between
Bluetooth devices. We built and evaluated a new method,
which is robust to heavy WiFi traffic, using a very wide
bandwidth ( 20 MHz) in conjunction with random frequency
hopping. We implemented our method on Google Nexus One
smartphones and conducted numerous experiments in indoor-
hallway and outdoor settings and using real-world measure-
ments, we showed that outdoor settings are best suited for
secret key extraction. Furthermore, we showed that the perfor-
mance of secret key generation using Bluetooth is comparable
to that of WiFi while using much lower transmit power.
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